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BEHAVIORAL CONTRACTING WITHIN THE FAMILIES OF 
DELINQUENTS* 
RICHARD B. STUART~ 
The University of Michigan 
Summary-The technique of behavioral contracting is used to strengthen the control of 
family and school over the behavior of delinquents. A behavioral contract is a means of 
scheduling the exchange of positive reinforcements among two or more persons. The use 
of these contracts is predicated upon four assumptions: (I) receipt of positive reinforce- 
ments in interpersonal exchanges is a privilege rather than a right; (2) effective inter- 
personal agreements are governed by the norm of reciprocity; (3) the value of an inter- 
personal exchange is a direct function of the range, rate and magnitude of the positive 
reinforcements mediated by that exchange; and (4) rules create freedom in interpersonal 
exchanges. The use of a behavioral contract with one delinquent girl is described and 
analyzed using Markovian methods. 
ANY INTERVENTION program intended for use 
with delinquents must first define a specific 
subpopulation as a target group. Delinquents 
may be subdivided according to whether their 
predominant offenses are or are not classifiable 
as adult crimes, whether they are initial or 
chronic offenders, and whether or not they 
reside in environments replete with constructive 
resources which can be mobilized to their ad- 
vantage. For many delinquents [e.g., for 24 per 
cent of the adolescent male wards of one 
Michigan county juvenile court (Huetteman, 
Briggs, Tripodi, Stuart, Heck and McConnell, 
1970)], violations of parental authority and other 
uniquely juvenile offenses (e.g., possession of 
alcoholic beverages and failure to attend school) 
constitute the only “crimes” ever recorded. 
Many engage in chronically dysfunctional inter- 
actions with their families and schools, both of 
which settings contain the rudiments of effective 
behavioral controls. 
A continuum of short- to intermediate-term 
dispositional goals is available for working with 
this group (see Fig. 1). Ranging from maintain- 
ing the youth in his natural home environment, 
through a series of semi-institutional settings, to 
institutionalization in correctional or psychiatric 
settings, the points along the continuum vary 
according to the extent to which they provide 
social structure and make use of natural forces 
of behavioral control in the community. Recent 
studies have shown that the more potent the 
influence of the natural environment throughout 
treatment, the greater the likelihood that be- 
havioral changes will be maintained following 
treatment. For example, it has been shown that 
two groups of delinquents, who spent an average 
of 131.6 days in psychiatric settings or 91-8 
days in correctional settings of every year that 
they were wards of the juvenile court, actually 
committed more offenses than another very 
similar group who were not institutionalized 
(Huetteman et al., 1970). Even stronger support 
of the need for community treatment is found in 
a large-scale review of many rehabilitation 
programs, which concluded with the finding that: 
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. . since severe penalties do not deter more effectively, 
and since prisons do not rehabilitate, and since the 
criminal justice system is inconsistent and has little 
quantitative impact on crime, the best rehabilitative 
possibilities would appear to be in the community 
(Harlow, 1970, pp. 33-34). 
Community treatment for large numbers of 
delinquents will be possible only when techniques 
have been developed which (a) are effective, 
(b) require comparatively little time for admini- 
stration, (c) can extend family influence to 
control behavior in a number of different 
situations, and (d) can be administered by para- 
professionals. It is suggested that behavioral 
contracting, to be described and illustrated in 
this paper, is one technique which meets each 
of these requirements and can be employed as a 
tactic in every instance in which efforts are made 
to strengthen the place of an adolescent in a 
natural, foster, or group home environment. 
RATIONALE 
At the core of the effort to use behavioral 
contracting to combat delinquency are two 
assumptions. First, it is assumed that the family 
plays a critical role in the etiology of delinquency 
when certain dysfunctional family interaction 
patterns coexist with a paucity of opportunities 
for acceptable performance in the community 
(Rodman and Grams, 1967) and when peer 
pressures are conducive to deviant behavior 
(Burgess and Akers, 1969). The family may 
function as a pathogen in two ways. First, the 
family may model and differentially reinforce 
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patterns of antisocial behavior (Bandura and 
Walters, 1963). Second, the family may inade- 
quately reinforce prosocial behavior in com- 
parison with the reinforcement of antisocial 
behavior available in the community. Stuart 
(1970a) showed that the family of delinquents 
could be differentiated from the families of 
nondelinquents on the basis of their low rate of 
positive exchanges, while Patterson and Reid 
(1971) demonstrated that interactional patterns 
of coercion are more common within delinquent 
families than patterns of reciprocity. 
The second assumption is that the family in 
many instances is a potentially powerful if not 
the only force available to aid the delinquent in 
acquiring prosocial responses. Over 15 years ago, 
Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) clearly showed that 
in studies of attitude formation and change the 
family accounts for over two-thirds of the 
observed variance. Modern sociologists such as 
Schafer and Polk (1967) have shown that most 
social agencies, including schools in particular, 
are more oriented toward removing than 
rehabilitating the delinquent. Therefore it is 
essential to both eliminate the pathogenic 
elements of the family and to harness its vast 
power in order to mount constructive programs 
to aid delinquents. 
BEHAVIORAL CONTRACTS 
A behavioral contract is a means of scheduling 
the exchange of positive reinforcements between 
two or more persons. Contracts have been used 
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when reciprocal patterns of exchange have 
broken down within families (Carson, 1969; 
Tharp and Wetzel, 1969) or in efforts to establish 
reciprocal exchanges from the outset in formal 
relationships in therapeutic (Sulzer, 1962) and 
scholastic (Homme, Csanyi, Gonzales and 
Rechs, 1969) settings. Contracts structure reci- 
procal exchanges by specifying: who is to do 
what, for whom, under what circumstances. 
They therefore make explicit the expectations of 
every party to an interaction and permit each 
to determine the relative benefits and costs to 
him of remaining within that relationship 
(Thibaut and Kelley, 1959). Furthermore, by 
making roles explicit for family members, 
contracts enhance the likelihood that responsi- 
bilities will be met, and by postulating reciprocal 
exchanges within families, contracts contribute 
to interactional stability. Finally, because 
privileges and responsibilities are fairly well- 
standardized across families the execution of 
behavioral contracts in time-limited, high- 
pressure settings is quite feasible.* 
Behavioral contracting with families rests 
upon four assumptions. First, it is assumed that: 
Receipt of positive reinforcements in inter- 
personal exchanges is a privilege rather than 
a right. 
A privilege in this sense is a special prerogative 
which one may enjoy at the will of another 
person upon having performed some qualifying 
task. For example, states bestow driving privi- 
leges upon citizens who qualify for this privilege 
by passing certain performance tests and by 
driving with standard prudence. In contrast, a 
right implies undeniable and inalienable access 
to a prerogative. Furthermore, a right cannot 
be denied, no matter what an individual might 
do. In modern society there are virtually no 
rights beyond the right of the individual to think 
as he may choose. For example, people in a 
democratic society have the privilege to say 
what they think, but not to shout “fire” in a 
crowded theater no matter how hard it is to 
find a seat. 
Within families it is the responsibility of one 
person to grant the privileges requested by 
another on a reciprocal basis. For example, an 
adolescent might wish free time-this is his 
privilege-and it is his parents’ responsibility to 
provide this free time. However, the parents may 
wish that the adolescent attend school each day 
prior to going out in the evening-the 
adolescent’s school attendance is their privilege 
and it is his responsibility to do as they ask. 
Privileges may, of course, be abused. Thus a 
parent might wish to know where his adolescent 
goes when he leaves home, but if the parents 
attack the adolescent when they learn of his 
plans, they have failed to meet their responsi- 
bility, i.e., use the information constructively. 
Thus it is appropriate to consider as a part of 
the definition of a privilege the conditions for 
its appropriate use. 
A second assumption underlying the use of 
behavioral contracts is: 
Eflective interpersonal agreements are 
governed by the norm of reciprocity. 
A norm is a “behavioral rule that is accepted, 
at least to some degree, by both members of the 
dyad (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959, p. 129)” Norms 
serve to increase the predictability of events in 
an interaction, permit the resolution of conflicts 
without recourse to power and have secondary 
reinforcing value in and of themselves (Gergen, 
1969, pp. 73-74). Reciprocity is the norm which 
underlies behavioral contracts. Reciprocity im- 
plies that “each party has rights and duties 
(Gouldner, 1960, p. 169),” and further, that 
items of value in an interchange must be ex- 
changed on an equity or quid pro quo (“some- 
thing for something [Jackson, 1965, p. 5911”) 
basis. Therefore, inherent in the use of be- 
havioral contracts is acceptance of the notion 
that one must compensate his partner fairly for 
*Behavior Change Systems (3156 Dolph Drive, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48103) makes available behavioral con- 
tracting kits, including code book and computer compatable code forms in addition to standardized materials for 
use with clients. 
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everything which is received, that is, there are 
no gifts to be expected within contractual 
relations. 
A third principle basic to the use of be- 
havioral contracts states that: 
The value of an interpersonal exchange is a 
direct function of the range, rate, and mag- 
nitude of the positive reinforcements mediated 
by that exchange. 
Byrne and Rhamey (1965) have expressed this 
assumption as a law of interpersonal behavior 
postulating that one’s attraction to another will 
depend upon the proportion and value of 
positive reinforcements garnered within that 
relationship. In a similar vein, Mehrabian and 
Ksionsky (1970) have reviewed many years of 
social psychological research supporting the 
conclusion that: “Situations where athliative 
behavior increases positive reinforcement . . . 
induce greater affiliative behavior (p. 115).” 
In the negotiation of behavioral contracts, 
through a process of accommodation (Gergen, 
1969, p. 73), each party seeks to offer to the 
other the maximum possible rate of positive 
reinforcement because the more positive rein- 
forcements which are emitted, the more will be 
received. In this sense, each positive offered 
represents an individual’s “investment” in a 
contract, and each privilege received represents 
“return on an investment.” Therefore a good 
intrafamilial contract encourages the highest 
possible rate of mutual reinforcement as repre- 
sented by the following diagram (Fig. 2) in 
which COFhrA implies the optimal choice for 
father, mother and adolescent, COF,MA the 
optimal choice for father which the mother and 
adolescent will accept, etc., and k a value- 
determining constant. 
The fourth and final assumption basic to the 
concept of behavioral contracting is: 
Rufes create freedom in interpersonal 
exchanges. 
When contracts specify the nature and condition 
for the exchange of things of value, they thereby 
stipulate the rules of the interaction. For 
example, when an adolescent agrees that she 
will visit friends after school (privilege) but that 
she will return home by 6.00 p.m. (responsi- 
bility), she has agreed to a rule governing the 
exchange of reinforcers. While the rule delimits 
COFMA =f [ COFIMAtCOM/FA t COA/FM 1 +k 
FIG. 2. 
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the scope of her privilege, it also creates the 
freedom with which she may take advantage of 
her privilege. Without this rule, any action taken 
by the girl might have an equal probability of 
meeting with reinforcement, extinction or 
punishment. If the girl did not have a clear-cut 
responsibility to return home at 6.00 p.m. she 
might return one day at 7.00 and be greeted 
warmly, return at 6.00 the next day and be 
ignored, and return at 5.30 the following day 
and be reprimanded. Only by prior agreement 
as to what hour would be acceptable can the 
girl insure her freedom, as freedom depends 
upon the opportunity to make behavioral 
choices with knowledge of the probable out- 
come of each alternative. 
Just as contracts produce freedom through 
detailing reciprocal rule-governed exchanges, so 
must contracts be born of freedom, since 
coerced agreements are likely to be violated as 
soon as the coercive force is removed. Therefore 
effective behavioral contracts must be negotiated 
with respect to the following paradigm: 
y/ R”‘es \, 
Freedom+ + Contracts 
ELEMENTS OF BEHAVIORAL 
CONTRACTS 
Good behavioral contracts contain five 
elements. First, the contracts must detail the 
privileges which each expects to gain after 
fulfilling his responsibilities. Typical privileges 
used in behavioral contracts in the families of 
delinquents include free time with friends, 
spending money, choice of hair and dress styles 
and use of the family car for the adolescent. 
Second, good contracts must detail the responsi- 
bilities essential to securing each privilege. 
Again, in the families of delinquents, responsi- 
bilities typically include maintenance of 
minimally adequate school attendance and per- 
formance, maintenance of agreed-upon curfew 
hours, completion of household chores and 
keeping parents informed about the adolescent’s 
whereabouts. Every effort is made to restrict 
privileges to prosocial behaviors and to keep 
responsibilities to a minimum. The former is 
necessary if the family is to effectively serve as 
an agent of social control. The latter is necessary 
because the parents of teenage children control 
comparatively few salient reinforcements and 
must use those which are controlled with suffi- 
cient care to maintain desired behavior. If the 
number of responsibilities is increased without 
comparable increase in the value of privileges 
offered, little or no reinforcement will be pro- 
vided for the new responsibilities and they are 
unlikely to be met, weakening the general 
credibility of the contract. 
As an added requirement, the responsibilities 
specified in a family contract must be monitor- 
able by the parents, for if the parents cannot 
determine when a responsibility has been 
fulfilled, they cannot know when to properly 
grant a privilege. Therefore there are some 
things which are beyond the scope of behavioral 
contracts, such as where an adolescent goes 
when he is not at home or whom he sees as 
friends. The single exception to this rule is the 
possibility of using school attendance and per- 
formance as responsibilities. While it can be 
argued that classroom behavioral management 
is the primary responsibility of teachers (Stuart, 
1970b), it is often not possible for a behavior 
modifier to gain access to any or all of an 
adolescent’s teachers (Bailey, Phillips and Wolf, 
1970), so he may be required to attempt to 
control behavior in school with reinforcements 
mediated in the home. When this is done, it is 
essential to arrange for systematic feedback to 
be provided by the teacher to the parent des- 
cribing the teenager’s attendance and perform- 
ance in class. A simple card brought for a 
teacher’s signature every day or every week by 
the teenager is a sufficient and very practical 
means of securing this feedback (see Fig. 3). 
The third element of a good behavioral 
contract is a system of sanctions for failure to 
meet responsibilities. While in one sense the 
possibility of time out from privileges should be 
adequate to insure the completion of responsi- 
bilities, there are obviously periods in the 
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course of family life when this is not the case. 
At all times, behavior is under multiple con- 
tingency control (Stuart, 197Oc), and in certain 
instances it is more reinforcing to violate the 
contract and to forfeit a subsequent privilege 
than to garner the rewards of adhering to the 
terms of the contract. At these times the existence 
of sanctions may tip the balance of a behavioral 
choice toward compliance with contractual 
obligations. Furthermore, sanctions have an 
added advantage: they provide the aggrieved 
party with a temperate means of expressing his 
displeasure. In families without explicit or 
understood behavioral contracts, the failure of 
a child to meet curfew is often met with threats 
of long-term “grounding”. Faced with the threat 
of not being permitted to go out for weeks on 
end, the teenager is often pursuaded to violate 
his contract even further and remain out later 
because the magnitude of the penalty is fixed 
and not commensurate with the magnitude of 
his violation. 
When sanctions are built into the contract, 
they may be of two types. One is a simple, linear 
penalty such as the requirement that the 
adolescent return home as many minutes early 
the following day as he has come in late on the 
preceding day. The second type of sanction is a 
geometric penalty which doubles or triples the 
amount of make-up time due following contract 
violations. It is probably best to combine both 
types of sanctions, making certain that lateness 
does not reach a point of diminishing return 
when it would actually be impractical for the 
adolescent to return home at all because he 
would incur no greater penalty for continued 
absence. 
The fourth element in a good behavioral 
contract is a bonus clause which assures positive 
reinforcement for compliance with the terms of 
the contract. Much behavior control within 
families consists of “negative scanning” (Stuart, 
1969) or the extinction of positive responding 
(by ignoring it) coupled with the severe punish- 
ment of negative responding. The effect of this 
punishment is, of course, to strengthen negative 
behavior as a consequence of the facts that 
attention follows negative behavior and does 
not follow positive responses (Madsen, Becker, 
Thomas, Kosar and Plager, 1968). To counter- 
act this, bonuses calling for permission to 
remain out longer than usual, extra money or 
extraordinary privileges such as the opportunity 
to have a party or to take a trip with friends are 
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built into contracts as contingencies for extended 
periods of near-flawless compliance with con- 
tractual responsibilities. 
When behavioral contracts are well executed, 
each member of the family is assured of receiving 
the minimum level of positive reinforcement 
(privileges) necessary to sustain his participation 
in the interaction. Furthermore, each party to 
the agreement is provided with a means of 
responding to contract violations and each is 
reinforced for long chains of desirable responses. 
The contract is not complete, however, unless 
a means is also built in for keeping track of the 
rates of positive reinforcements given and 
received. This is accomplished through feedback 
systems which serve two functions. First, they 
cue each individual as to how to respond in 
order to earn an additional inducement. Second, 
they signal each person when to reinforce the 
other. Furthermore, the provision of feedback 
in this context also sets the occasion for positive 
comments which themselves strengthen prosocial 
behavior. The exchange of feedback is facilitated 
by the use of a behavioral monitoring form 
calling for each person to check off the fulfill- 
ment of his own responsibilities (which includes 
provision of the privileges of the others). 
ILLUSTRATION 
A behavioral contract constituted the primary 
treatment procedure in the management of a 
16-year-old girl who was referred to the Family 
and School Consultation Project by the local 
juvenile court. At the time of referral, Candy 
Bremer” had been hospitalized as an inpatient 
at a local psychiatric hospital following alleged 
promiscuity, exhibitionism, drug abuse and 
home truancy. Associated with these complaints 
was an allegation by her parents that Candy 
engaged in chronically antagonistic exchanges 
within the family and had for a year done near- 
failing work in school. Owing to the cost of 
private psychiatric care, the parents sought 
hospitalization at state expense by requesting 
*Pseudonym. 
that the juvenile court assume wardship. After 
initiating this action, the parents were informed 
by a court-appointed attorney representing their 
daughter that the allegations would probably not 
stand up in court. The parents accordingly 
modified their request to a petition that the 
court place Candy on the consent docket 
affording quasi-ward status without termination 
of parental rights. 
At the time of referral, Mr. and Mrs. Bremer 
were 64 and 61 years old respectively, and both 
were physically ill-Mr. Bremer suffering from 
emphysema and Mrs. Bremer from a degenera- 
tive bone disease in her hip. Both holding 
college degrees, Mr. Bremer performed scholarly 
work at home on a part-time basis while Mrs. 
Bremer worked as a medical secretary. Candy, 
the third of their three children, was 20 years 
younger than her oldest sister. The Bremers 
resided in a very small ranch-type home which 
lacked a basement, so privacy could only be 
found in the bedrooms. 
Initially, Mr. and Mrs. Bremer wished to 
maintain virtually total control over Candy’s 
behavior. They were reluctantly willing to accept 
her at home but established as conditions that 
she adhere to a punishing curfew which allowed 
her out of the home for periods averaging 2 to 3 
hours per summer day. Great effort was 
expended to convince the parents of the need 
to modify their expectations and to modify a 
continuous chain of negative interactions. How- 
ever, when both of these efforts failed, it was 
decided to execute a behavioral contract anyway, 
because the problems expected at home seemed 
less negative than the probable consequences of 
continued institionalization and because it was 
hoped that a more realistic contract could be 
effectuated as time progressed. Within 3 weeks 
of the start of the contract, Candy was reported 
to be sneaking out of her bedroom window at 
night, visiting a local commune and returning 
home before dawn. It was found that over a 
24-day period there were eight major contract 
violations, and the probability of an extended 
series of days of contract compliance was quite 
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small* (see Fig. 4). While it was deemed vital 
to introduce more privileges for Candy, it 
seemed imprudent to do this as a contingency 
for her having violated her contract in the 
past. Finally it was decided to do two things. 
A new contract, which was far more permissive, 
was introduced (see Fig. 5), accompanied by a 
new monitoring sheet (see Fig. 6), but a new 
court order was requested and granted which 
proscribed Candy from entering the communes. 
Candy was made to understand that, should she 
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be found in either commune, not she but the 
commune members would be liable to prosecu- 
tion for contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor as they had been officially informed of 
the limitation placed upon Candy’s activities. 
As seen in Fig. 4, this modified contract was 
quite effective, increasing the rate of compliance 
to the contract terms to a very respectable high 
rate. When court wardship was terminated and 
the contract was the sole behavioral prosthesis, 
Candy’s behavior actually continued to improve. 
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*These and subesquent data were evaluated using a Markovian chain designed to make predictions of future 
behavior based upon observation of past behavior in 24-day blocks. For an extended discussion of this procedure, 
see Kemeny, Mirkil, Snell and Thompson (1959). In simplified form, the analysis is completed through the following 
steps: (I) write thesericsof dichotomousobservationsasaseriesof i, - notations (+ - - + + - f, etc.); (2) count 
the number of -+ +, + -, - -t and - - sequences, recording the totals in a 2 x 2 table; (3) compute the 
proportion of f i vs f - and - f vs - - sequences and enter these decimals in the appropriate cells of a 
2 x 2 table; (4) draw as many Markovian tree forms as needed following the illustration in Fig. 3; (5) for each 
+ +, i -, - f and - - series, write in the proportions obtained in step 3; (6) multiply all such entries in 
0.6 Cf 
each series. CHECKS: (a) entries at each pair of branching alternatives (C+ =) must total 1.00 (0.6 i 0.4). 
0.4 c- 
(b) The probability of all series must total 1.00. 
Inrerpreration. The obtained values may be interpreted as the probability that each series, (e.g. f i - -) will 
occur, relative to all other series, assuming constant conditions. 
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FIG. 5. BEHAVIORAL CONTRACT. 
General 
PRIVILEGE.S 
In exchange for the privilege of remaining together 
and preserving some semblance of family integrity, 
Mr. and Mrs. Bremer and Candy all agree to 
Specific 
In exchange for the privilege of riding the bus 
directly from school into town after school on 
school days 
In exchange for the privilege of going out at 7.00 
p.m. on one weekend evening without having to 
account for her whereabouts 
In exchange for the privilege of going out a second 
weekend night 
In exchange for the privilege of going out between 
11.00 a.m. and 5.15 p.m. Saturdays, Sundays and 
holidays 
In exchange for the 
complete household 
curfew 
Bonuses and Sancfiorls 
privilege of having Candy 
chores and maintain her 
If Candy is I-10 minutes late 
If Candy is 1 l-30 minutes late 
If Candy is 31-60 minutes late 
For each half hour of tardiness over one hour, 
Candy 
Candy may go out on Sunday evenings from 7.00 
to 9.30 p.m. and either Monday or Thursday 
evening 
Candy may add a total of two hours divided 
among one to three curfews 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
concentrate on positively reinforcing each other’s 
behavior while diminishing the present overemphasis 
upon the faults of the others. 
Candy agrees to phone her father by 4.00 p.m. to 
tell him that she is all right and to return home by 
5.15 p.m. 
Candy must maintain a weekly average of “B” in 
the academic ratings of all of her classes and must 
return home by 11.30 p.m. 
Candy must tell her parents by 6.00 p.m. of her 
destination and her companion, and must return 
home by 11.30 p.m. 
Candy agrees to have completed all household 
chores before leaving and to telephone her parents 
once during the time she is out to tell them that 
she is all right. 
Mr. and Mrs. Bremer agree to pay Candy $1.50 on 
the morning following days on which the money is 
earned. 
she must come in the same amount of time earlier 
the following day, but she does not forfeit her 
money for the day. 
she must come in 22-60 minutes earlier the following 
day and does forfeit her money for the day. 
she loses the privilege of going out the following 
day and does forfeit her money for the day. 
loses her privilege of going out and her money for 
one additional day. 
if she abides by all the terms of this contract from 
Sunday through Saturday with a total tardiness not 
exceeding 30 minutes which must have been made 
up as above. 
if she abides by all the terms of this contract for 
two weeks with a total tardiness not exceeding 30 
minutes which must have been made up as above 
and if she requests permission to use this additional 
time by 9.00 p.m. 
MONITORNO 
Mr. and Mrs. Bremer agree to keep written records of the hours of Candy’s leaving 
and coming home and of the completion of her chores. 
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DISCUSSION 
Behavioral contracting served as a very useful 
means of structuring a constructive interaction 
between Candy and her parents. By removing 
from the realm of contention the issues of 
privileges and responsibilities, the eliciters of 
many intrafamilial arguments were eliminated. 
When fights did occur, they tended to be 
tempered by the options available through the 
contract. The contract itself cannot account for 
a change in Candy’s behavior; but the contract 
apparently served to assure the use of privileges 
such as free time and money as contingencies 
in the truest sense of the term. 
The process of negotiating a contract through 
accommodation of each other’s wishes (Gergen, 
1969) might have been characterized as an 
“experience in form” by John Dewey. It appears 
to have laid the groundwork for a more effective 
interaction and in this case was adequate in and 
of itself. In other instances, it is likely that 
behavioral contracting could profitably be 
supplemented with interaction training for the 
parents, tutoring or vocational guidance for the 
adolescent or financial assistance for the family. 
The decision about which additional techniques 
should be employed is discretionary, but it is 
suggested that behavioral contracting be made 
a part of every plan to improve the interaction 
between an adolescent and his parents. 
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